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When students apply to universities or unemployed workers search in the labor market, an
increase of time input of one person (resulting in more applications) will increase the waiting
time of the others. In this paper it will be show that in a decentralized market there will be
excessive congestion Moreover, congestion increases with both the mean and the variance
of the net benefits associated with waiting across the population.
I. Introduction
Since the seminal work of Becker (1965),  the economic importance of the allocation of
time is widely accepted. Becker showed that consumers can be viewed as producers of
commodities by combining inputs of goods and time according to the standard theory of
the firm, and that in many occasions time and goods are substitutes. For major sport
events or concerts for example, one can choose to spend a night at the ticket office or
pay much more at the black market. For some composite goods, the time input increases
the value of the product. The longer one is willing to spend in the waiting room, the
more medical care one will get and the more application letters one writes, the larger
the probability to get a job offer will be.
In many of those activities there are important externalities when an increase in the time
input of one agent increases the waiting time of other agents. If for example filling a
vacancy requires a positive amount of screening time, then any individual job searcher
who decides to join one or more job queues, will increase his individual hiring probability
but will also increase the average waiting time of the other job searchers. The probability
to get a subsidy or rent controlled housing is also increasing in (time consuming) search
effort. At the aggregate level however, high search intensity can lead to congestion. In
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other words, every time an agent joins a queue, he does not internalize the waiting costs
and the “discouragement” effect he places on other agents.’ Still, Barro and Romer
(1987) showed that queues do not necessary reflect inefficiencies. In many cases the price
per effective unit of service adjusts automatically if the explicit price is held fixed. One
gets for example faster and better service in empty planes or restaurants than in full
ones.
This paper gives some examples of cases in which there will be excessive waiting. We will
see that congestion increases with both the mean and the variance of net rewards of
waiting across the population. In the next section a small model of waiting will be
presented in which we allow individuals to join more than one queue. Section III
considers the case in which individuals differ in opportunity costs and rewards of waiting
and section IV presents a labor market example.
II. The model
Consider an action A which can be completed by a limited amount of agents per time
interval. Let the rate at which agents can complete A be exponentially distributed with
parameter ~1.  We can think of A as e.g. applying to a university, buying a ticket, making
a public phone call, or screening a job applicant. We will assume that the expected
rewards of completing A are equal to y. In a subsidized goods model, y is equal to the
price minus the money value of the good, while in a job search model y is the probability
of a job offer times the expected wealth change of a (new) job. In any case, the larger
the value of y, the larger the expected benefits of waiting are.* We will furthermore
assume that the arrival rate of agents who want to undertake action A follows a Poisson
process with parameter CL In many cases agents can apply for more than one action per
time interval (e.g. a firm can apply for different subsidies, and a worker can apply for
more than one job). Let fi  be the number of actions which agent i can undertake at a
’ The author of this article appologizes for increasing the average waiting time of other submitters.
*  Akerlof et al. show for example that unemployed workers have incentives to wait longer with accepting
a job offers in recessions because wages are expected to be higher in booms.
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cost cts. If in a certain time interval, the arrival of applications (5~)  exceeds the number
of actions which can be handled in a certain time interval (cl),  queues of agents will be
formed. With this information we are already able to derive the steady state queue line
distribution and the equilibrium amount of waiting agents.
A. Steady state properties
Let P, be the probability to find n agents in the system. Then in the steady state, the
probability of being in state n and moving towards another state, within a very small time
interval h, has to be equal to the probability of being in state n-l or state n-2 and moving
to state n. Hence.
Pph + P#h = P,-,ah  + Pn+#h (1)
For every possible state, a balance equation like (1) can be written. As cP,,  = 1, there is
a unique solution for the ergodic steady state queue line distribution which can be found
by repeated substitution.3:
P” = (U>“(l-2)
P P
(2)
If we allow t to be greater than 1, we can determine the steady state queue length in
persons as follows.
L = j$ n(Sa)y,  -Lf) = L (3)
n  1 CI wEa
Note that we divided the amount of units in the system by the average value of f to get
the queue length in persons.4. The total expected duration to complete A (II) is given
3 Details can be found in any standard operations research text book, see e.g. Gross and Harris (1985).
4 The necessary condition for an equilibrium to exist is that the average screening rate exceeds the
average arrival rate of applications ( ~>.$oI).  In what follows, we will assume that this condition will be met.
If this condition is not met, waiting time will go to infinity.
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by L/a! or’:
D= l
(cc  - Ea)
(4)
When agents are “served” according to a FIFO (first in first out) principle, there are no
direct incentives for E to exceed one6. But under a SIR0  system (service in random
order) there are potential benefits for agents to choose larger E’s , An example of a
SIR0  system is search in the labor market.
The probability to finish A for an individual agent (pi)  can be written as (a$&%),
where [” is the average value of t chosen by the other agents. We will assume that the
action of agent i has a neglectable influence on the aggregate waiting rate and that agent
i takes t” as given, hence:
pi = -Qp  - aEc)
EC
So we see that the individual hiring rate is increasing in ti, but that the aggregate hiring
rate is decreasing in t because higher 4’s only lead to more congestion. The value of
“waiting” in a SIR0  system can be expressed as an asset:
(6)
Where rB,  is the expected income stream of joining the queue and pi is given by (4).
Note that we expressed the costs of waiting as a flow variable but of course any flow
variable can be transformed into a stock variable. The agent’s problem is now to choose
a value for pi which maximizes ‘B,. To simplify things we will set Jl equal to 2. Ei* can
now be obtained by maximizing (6) with respect to &. This yields:
5 See e.g. Little (1961).
6 It is however easy to extend the model to allow for multiple service points. In that case agents can
choose to join more queues so that also under a FIFO system there are incentives to join more than one
queue. For an example in the labor market see e.g. Gautier (1996).
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(7)
The socially optimal value for E’ will differ because a social planner will internalize the
waiting externalities. Hence, 4*  will be equal to one if the benefits of joining the queue
exceed the costs or in other words if y exceeds its reservation value yr:
and zero otherwise.
In the decentralized economy, Ei will be larger than or equal to one when condition (8)
holds. If y is for example equal to 4&/(~-at),  all agents will choose [i to equal 2. The
probability to be selected to complete A does not change but the expected waiting time
will be longer than in the social optimum where t* would be 1. We see thus that the
larger the value of y is, the more excess congestion there will be in equilibrium.
III. Differences in the rewards of waiting across the population
In this section we will allow for heterogeneity in the sense that either the opportunity
costs of waiting or the rewards of waiting differ over the population. Not surprisingly, we
will see that agents with low opportunity costs of waiting will be overrepresented in the
queues.7
In the labor market for example, different workers have different expected rewards and
opportunity costs of joining a queue. We will therefore consider y to be a drawing from
a distribution F(y) with pdf f(y). Since ti depends on y, 4i will be left censored at y =y’. 8
The conditional mean (5,) of Ei is given by:
7 A similar point was made by Becker (1965).
8 We will abstract from integer issues regarding &here.
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Where:
I is an indicator function which has value one if y 2~’ and zero otherwise. We see that
when the mean of y increases (while the other moments do not change), E will be larger
and consequently there will be more congestion. A change in the (unconditional)
variance of y has an ambiguous effect on the unconditional mean (calculated over the
entire population) of &.
Now let H(y)  be a mean preserving spread of F(y), where H is more spread than F. Then
if y is drawn from H instead of F, both the fraction of agents who benefit a lot from
joining the queue and the fraction of agents who have better things to do than waiting,
will increase. The first group will choose large &‘s but the last group will cause the mass
at the lower support of H(y) to be larger than the mass at the lower support of F(y). The
average &, over the agents who have decided to wait (fw), will however unambiguously
increase. Consequently, f, will be larger when y is drawn from H than when y is drawn
from F.
In the next section a labor market example will be given in which this Ew is the relevant
variable.
IV. An example for the labor market
If we interpret y as the improvement in wealth associated with a job offer and p as the
screening rate, then the above described results imply that less agents will join job
queues when y is drawn from F(y) than when y is drawn from H(y). Those agents who
do decide to search will however search more intensive (choose higher t:s)  and will
therefore cause more congestion on each other. The conditional mean of ti will
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accordingly be larger under H. We will assume now that employers can choose how many
vacancies to open, given that the expected rents of a vacancy @-IV,) are given by:9
fWv = +s-y-0 (11)
Where CY/V is the probability that the vacancy will be filled, s is the employer’s share of
the match surplus and y is the flow cost of keeping the vacancy open. Employers realize
that only agents (and not applications) can fill up vacancies so the supply of vacancies
will be independent of &,,.lo Under free entry and when all profit opportunities are
explored, rW, will be zero in equilibrium. Hence V=cus/y.  The easiest way to picture this
job search process is by introducing a single labor office which screens all applications
and offers jobs at a rate PV. Unemployment (U) can now be defined to be equal to the
amount of waiting agents. Adjusting (2) yields:
u= a 1
V - Ewa = crdv-E,
(12)
Since there are no contact delays in this model, increases in cx  will be absorbed by an
increase in V and will not affect unemployment nor the hazard rate”. An Increase in
the application intensity of the workers will lead to higher unemployment. From (9) we
see that an increase in the mean of y leads to a larger value of E,,,  and hence to more
unemployment. Finally, when y is drawn from H(y)  instead of F(y), there will be: (1) Less
unemployment inflow because the mass at the lower support will be larger than under
Fb). (2) Less unemployment outflow because T/will fall (thus employment will also fall).
(3) An increase in the unemployment stock because the average number of applications
9 This is a common assumption in the search equilibrium literature, see e.g. Pissarides (1990).
lo The larger contact probability, associated with a larger value of t,will  be exactly offset by a lower
acceptance probability.
‘*  Mortensen (1982) discusses externalities which arise when an action by one of the players not only
decreases the probability to get a future reward for other players but also ends the game. In matching models
for example, the match surplus is shared after a worker and vacancy have found each other. Afterwards the
contact probabilities for other workers and vacancies change (see also Diamond 1982). The model in this
paper is different because there are screening delays rather than contact delays, the supply of vacancies is
always proportional to the amount of job searching agents and the game does not end when the action is
completed.
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per applicant, [, has increased and therefore there will be more congestion.
V. Final remarks
In this paper we showed that actions which can be completed by a limited amount of
agents per unit of time can give rise to negative externalities. Those externalities will not
only be larger when the mean of the outside opportunities increases but also when the
variance increases. In this case the representative agent framework (which only deals
with first moments) is not sufficient’*.
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